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1. Introduction
For the German observer the idea of a Company repurchasing its own shares
seems to resemble the picture of a snake eating its own tail. It appears to be
highly unnatura1  and one wonders how the tail tan possibly be eatable for the
snake.
Not in the United States. Although repurchases have once been subject to the
most stubbornly fought conflict in US Company law’ only some modest
disclosure requirements and safeguards against overt market manipulation
exist today. Large repurchases are an almost everyday event and there is an
increasing tendency. The aggregate value of shares repurchased by NYSE
listed companies has increased from $ 1 .l billion in 1975 to $ 6.3 billion in
1982 to $ 37.1 billion in 1985*. Few examples may illustrate this practice
further:
Within three years Ford Motor Corp. repurchased 30 million shares for $ 1.2
billion3. In 1985 Phillips Petroleum Corp. was faced with two hostile bids and
took several defensive Steps, one of which was to tender for 20 million of its
own shares at a total tost of $ 1 billion. And by the end of 1988 Exxon Corp.
retired 28 percent of its shares that had once been outstanding at an aggregate
tost of $ 14.5 billion4.
The Situation in Germany is completely different. As it will be shown under
German law repurchases are severely restricted and do
appreciable amount at all.
not take place at an
In contrast to German law the United Kingdom does not prohibit repurchases
but requires companies to comply with such complex rules that US companies
would regard simply as limiting their economic freedom. Therefore UK
companies very seldom repurchase their own shares, too5.3
This Paper deals with repurchases by quoted companies, in particular the UK
public Company and the more or less German equivalent, the
Aktiengesellschaft (AG). It seeks to ascertain the reasons why companies
might want to engage in those activities. Moreover, it tries to analyse the
Problems which may arise from repurchases and the safeguards which the UK
and German legal Systems provide for these Problems.
II. Historical Development
There were no Problems arising out of the repurchase by a Company of its own
shares until the concept of capital as a permanent fund to be kept intact was
developed. The notion of shares as financial units was non-existent, and
therefore no provisions for reducing the number of shares existed in the early
history of English Company law.
This changed with its further development. The fact that deeds of settlement of
many companies in the eighteenth century made provisions for the repurchase
of own shares6 Shows that that the practice prevailed long before it gave rise to
any litigation. The first cases, however, inclined to the view that if the power to
repurchase shares was included in the deed of settlement, it would be upheld
and the retiring member would be free from responsibility for the company’s
debts7. On the other hand, several cases denied the validity of such
provisions8. But none of these cases seemed to realise the deeper implications
of this matter, so that it is no wonder that there was no uniformity in the  case
law.
A Change was brought about by the Companies Act 1867 which provided for
the reduction of capital. The courts had to face the Problem of repurchases
under new legislation, but there was still no common opinion on this matter’.
However, the decision in Trevor v. Whit~orth’~ settled the law on this subject
and established that a Company could not repurchase its own shares, even4
though there was an express power to do so in its memorandum, since this
would amount to a reduction of capital. The protection of creditors was by far
11
the most decisive Point in this decision . In considering the decision in this
case one has to bear in mind that the principle of limited liability was still a
relatively new concept and the ghost of the so-called South Sea Bubble, a
financial scandal in which the limited liability of a Company had been used for
fraudulent purposes, was still prominent in English jurisprudence. With this
background  one tan readily understand the consternation of their Lordships at
such transactions.
However, it was later recognised that the rigid application of this principle might
be unduly stritt and thus over the years the common law has allowed certain
12
exceptions . With the growth of the common law exceptions, it was recognised
that to a certain extent the Prohibition was too restrictive upon commercial
activities. There have emerged statutory modifications which evidenced a
gradual movement away from the strictness of the rules. This showed an
increasing realization that the Company, like an individual, requires flexibility if
it is to be able to compete as a viable entity in the world market. However, in
the years immediately following the decision the rule laid down in Trevor v.
Whitworth and its basic principle remained intact13.
The Second Council Directive on Company Law permitted the UK to maintain
the existing exceptions to the Trevor v. Whitworfh rule but did not require to
extend them14. The UK, however, encouraged by a study undertaken by L.C.B.
Gower for the government (a so-called ‘Green paper’)15, decided to widen the
exceptions. This decision, although taking into account the Situation in which
public companies were at that time, was mainly motivated by the wish to make
private companies more attractive for outside investors. Under the CA 1985
public companies are generally able, subject to procedural requirements, to
repurchase their own shares 16. The conditions for such a repurchase include
that the purchase monies may only be found out of distributable Profits or the5
proceeds of a fresh issue of shares and that, once repurchased, the shares
must be treated as cancelled and the issued share capital of the Company
reduced by their nominal amount.
The early history of German Company law Shows a changeable attitude towards
the repurchase of own shares. Before 1870 the Allgemeines Deutsches
Handelsgesetzbuch did not contain any provisions relating to the repurchase of
17
own shares at all . Until the late 1960s some German scholars even denied
the theoretical possibility that a Company could become its own member18
.
However, the first amendment to the ADHGB of 1870 brought into forte a
Provision which forbade the repurchase of shares for companies
19
and a few
years later the Reichsoberhandelsgericht invalidated sales to a Company of its
own shares2’. As a reaction to vehement criticism against this absolute
Prohibition in the academic literature21, in 1884 an amendment of the ADHGB
provided that companies might not acquire their own shares in the ‘course of
their business’
22
. An amendment of 1897 altered the language of the Provision
to the effect that a Company must not acquire its own shares ‘in its regular
course of business’. The Object of this amendment was to make clear that
irregular occurrences, such as acquisition by gift, should be exempt from the
Prohibition. However, the new wording of the statute was weak and interpreted
both by scholars and practitioners to mean that any repurchase which was not
a regular business transaction, such as repurchases to support the market
price, was allowed. Therefore, in practice, the Prohibition remained ineffective
and was ignored
23
.
In the years of severe business contraction in 1929 as earnings declined, many
German companies attempted to sustain the market price of their shares by
repurchases. They were able to do so because the deflationary process
released funds which could be used for the repurchase of shares. Particularly
banks were active in this movement, prompted by the fear that the market price6
of their shares might fall below par value - an idea considered fatal to a bank.
By the beginning of 1931 the Bremer Bankverein had repurchased 64 percent
of its own shares, the Darmstädter Nationalbank 58 percent and the Dresdner
Bank 55 percent
24
. Solely by reason of financial necessity was the practice
abandoned after the 1931 collapse of the stock market. Shortly afterwards an
emergency decree prohibited the repurchase of own shares in principle25. Only
very limited exceptions were allowed. Amendments in 1937, 1959 and 1965
tightened up the provisions even further.
Therefore, the implementation of the 2nd Directive by an amendment in 1978
brought only limited changes for German Company law26. The content of the
provisions in its earlier forms was restructured and markedly tightened up. At
present, in principle an AG may not repurchase its own shares. It may
repurchase its own shares, however, where it is necessary to prevent serious
and imminent harm to its interests, to offer the shares for sale to its employees
and its retired employees or to pay compensation  to minority shareholders in
subsidiaries that are being wound up or integrated into the parent AG27. In
these circumstances the repurchase may not exceed 10 percent of the  capital
stock and the amount paid must come out of Surplus capital. Those shares held
by an AG have no voting rights.
At this Point, it is already possible to see that in some respect UK law goes a
different way from German law. While in the UK a Company may acquire as
many shares as it likes as long as it camplies with certain requirements, a
German Company has this power only within very restricted situations and then
only within the 10 percent limit. Because of the fact that there is no limit on the
repurchases UK legislation contains a stritt requirement that repurchased
shares have to be cancelled. More differentes have to be considered later.7
II. Incentives for Repurchases
A short definition of the term ‘repurchase’ tan be given by saying that it means
that a Company acquires its own shares from one or more shareholders by
paying or agreeing to pay in cash or another consideration. The repurchase
results from a specific agreement between the Company and the shareholder
which is entered into after the shares have been alloted. This distinguishes
those transactions  from those where companies buy back their redeemable
shares28. While the redemption of shares is well known under UK law2’ it is
not possible under German law. However, both are a transaction which
purports to reverse the process of creating shares by terminating the legal
incidents connoted by the shares involved.
Although it has been submitted that companies rarely have good reasons for
repurchasing their shares
30
, there are several possible reasons why they wish
to do so3’.
1. Repurchases as a Capital Reduction
Some companies resch a Point in their development where, through lack of
new investment opportunities, contraction of markets, or a decision to scale
down operations, it is desirable to reduce the equity base.
In the case of companies with excess equity they might be interested in
returning the Surplus resources to the shareholders through a repurchase,
rather than go through the procedural complexities of a capital reduction. A
repurchase, therefore, allows the retirement of capital no longer needed by
companies and it removes the pressure on such companies to employ those
32
Surplus resources in uneconomic ways . While repurchases in these cases
resemble the payment of dividends in that both are methods of distributing and8
therefore reducing corporate assets, they tan be used to fulfill dividend-type
33
functions .
However, it should not be overlooked that there are significant differentes
between a payment of a dividend and the repurchase of own shares.
Repurchases may have advantages both for the Company and its shareholders
under certain circumstances but sometimes may also put the shareholder at a
disadvantage.
In the case where the Surplus cash arises not from a continuing Source like
long-term Profits, such repurchases at a premium may be a means of making a
once and only special distribution to particular vendor shareholders without
raising the general dividend rate. This might satisfy shareholders’ preferences
much better and might be able to ensure a better dividend continuity for the
Company. The management is usually reluctant to declare reduced dividends
for the next year after a high dividend has been payed in the last.
Furthermore, in a repurchase the shareholders are given the choice as to
whether to accept the offer or not, whereas they do not have any Option in the
case of dividend distributions. Keeping this in mind, a repurchase offer made to
all shareholders has the benefit of providing shareholders with the choice
between an increased share of corporate ownership by retaining their shares or
a cash return by accepting the offer. Repurchases tan, from this Point of view,
be a more flexible and efficient financial technique for shareholders than a
capital reduction which are in some jurisdictions a more cumbersome
procedure. The self-selectivity of this process tan be an advantage for the
shareholders as a group as weil. However, it should not be forgotten that a
dividend payment leaves unaffected the recipient shareholder’s Position as a
participant in the Company.
elimination as participant in
interest in the Company.
A repurchase, however, results either in his
the Company or at least in a reduction of his9
Moreover, a disadvantage is that while in the case of dividends the principle of
pro rata participation is characteristic and all shareholders are treated with
transparent fairness, in the case of repurchases it might be different. There is
always the danger of discrimination if the Company is not be bound to take up
shares pro-rata
35
.
Lastly, whereas a dividend payment is a unilateral act, a repurchase is a
transaction. The fairness of the transaction depends upon an Optimum balance
of information between the Company and its shareholders. Any Change in this
relationship is able to create informational asymmetries between shareholders
and the management and will put the shareholder at an disadvantage.
2. Repurchases as a Self-Investment
A repurchase may be used as a commercial investment by
From the managerial perspective, such a repurchase
the Company.
is a minimum risk-
investment as the risk characteristics of the Company are not substantially
changed: the management might feel that if the Company buys another
company’s shares, the risk to the enterprise may be greater by the possibly
unfamiliar risk characteristics of the latter Company. From this Point of view a
repurchase is preferable to acquiring substantial or controlling interests in other
companies, especially where the management takes the view that the market
price of the shares is lower than the true value and profit tan be made upon
their latter reissue36
. This objective, however, requires that the Company is
permitted to hold the repurchased shares as treasury shares and that it is not
obliged to cancel them.
But even where treasury shares are permitted, one has to question whether
repurchases constitute a self-investment by the Company. If one is not too
doubtful about the management’s ability to identify an undervalued Situation in10
an efficient market, one still has to deny the possibilty of repurchases as an
investment. With normal investment, cash is converted into working assets.
Profitable investments will increase the size of the Company. However, if a
Company repurchases its own shares no cash is converted into working assets.
Both the Company assets and the shareholders’ equity decreases. A
repurchase is rather a ‘disinvestment’ than an investment37
.
3. Repurchases to Influence the Share Price
Company controllers  may seek to conduct the repurchase in such a way as to
influence the share price. This tan be for several reasons.
Where a large shareholder in a Company intends to sell his shares, the
Company may wish to ensure that these shares are not dumped on the market,
with a resulting decline in the price of its shares. In those cases it tan be in the
interests of the Company to repurchase these shares. A repurchase allows
companies to directly enter the market and soak up such Surplus shares by
acquiring them, thereby increasing demand for the shares and supporting their
market price.
Further repurchases may be used to give price support for undervalued shares
where the management believes the current market price of the shares is below
their long term value. This was the main reason behind about 650 repurchase
announcements  made by US companies after the 1987 market Crash 38. Here
the repurchase is nothing else than an attempt to lessen or eliminate any
discrepancy between the market price of the shares and their estimated long-
term net asset backing. The management might try to put a ‘floor’ under the
current market price so as to preserve for shareholders the value of their
marketable securities.
This could also help where the Company needs to improve the market price for
the purpose of attracting new investors, thereby increasing demand for the11
shares and further raising the market price, thus creating a so-called ‘snowball
effect’3g. Selective purchases, designed to maintain or increase the market
price of the shares, may allow the Company to issue fewer shares, but at a
considerable premium.
Empirical findings seem to support this view: during periods of stock market
decline, the number of US companies repurchasing their own shares and the
frequency of their repurchases generally increases
40
. And during the economic
crisis in the early 1930s many German companies engaged in repurchase
activities to support the market price of their own shares.
lt has been suggested that this market behavior is unobjectionable where, in an
effort to support the market price of the shares and protect against professional
manipulation, a large block of shares overhanging the market and threatening
to depress the price of the shares on the stock exchange is repurchased by the
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Company itself . Otherwise for a Company the result could be fatal, since
depressed prices on the stock exchange affect sales and credit standings.
Moreover, repurchases could be the only availiable means of safeguarding a
decent market appraisal for the bulk of shareholders.
This view, however, is open to criticism because it fails to notice two important
Points:
Firstly, from the Point of view the efficient market-theory takes42, it is unlikely
that the market systematically and persistently undervalues companies. At any
rate, even if the effficient market occasionally makes mistakes, the number of
such mistakes is unlikely to be as high as the number of actual repurchase
Programmes.
Secondly, a better corrective to support an undervalued share price in a case
in which the company’s share price falls in isolation might be the supply of
adequate information to the market. Where the market trusts nonverbal Signals
more, the Company will still be able to respond by raising its regular dividends.12
4. Repurchases to Supply Market Information
This leads us to the next incentive for a Company to repurchase its own shares.
A Company may undertake a repurchase to supply the stock market with new
information about a company’s operating Performance and its future projects.
Here the announcement  may act as a market Signal that the Company
considers its shares undervalued. In addition to this it may Signal that the
Company expects large cash flows in the future and that it tan afford to return
some funds to shareholders.
Therefore, it has been suggested that repurchases are to be preferred as they
are, in contrast to dividend distributions, unlikely to provide misleading Signals
to the market3.
However, this does not take into account that a repurchase might be
interpreted as a negative Signal that the Company is exhausting profitable
investment opportunities
44
. From that Point of view repurchases are open to
the same misinterpretation  as dividends. There are less costly ways to provide
the market with information, if it is necessary to do this.
Nevertheless, this view is not supported by empirical findings. Repurchases by
tender offer typically lead to an increase in share price that persists beyond the
exspiration of the offer45. Most commentators interpret this as evidente that
repurchase announcements lead stock market participants to infer that the
share price is too low and that the repurchase Programme is a  Signal to the
market of the management’s more favorable information, so-called ‘signalling
hypothesis’ 46. As a result, market participants revise their forecasts of the
company’s prospects and this leads to a higher market price.13
5. Repurchases in a Takeover Context
The power to repurchase own shares tan be utilised as a defensive technique
in the face of a threatened, pending or actual takeover bid or as a preventive
means of reducing a company’s vulnerability to unwelcome offers.
A possible pre-bid measure might be to undertake a repurchase in  Order to
lessen the attractiveness of the target Company by altering the company’s
financial Profile. Such a repurchase will be designed to reduce the company’s
cash reserves or to increase its debt
47
.
Another pre-bid measure is to eliminate potentially dissident or wavering
shareholders who might accept a takeover bid through repurchases and so
48 remove the threat of the shares falling into the hands of a hostile bidder .
Furthermore, repurchases from shareholders who have the lowest reservation
values forte the bidder to buy shares from shareholders with higher reservation
values. This raises the tost of such a bid and makes the Company a less
attractive target4g. Such a repurchase may also enhance the proportional
holding of an existing control or management supporting group50
.
After a bid has been made repurchases still tan be used as a post-bid
defensive measure.
A Company may support the market price of the company’s shares and thereby
thwart or diminish the capacity of potential or actual bidders to obtain a share
foothold at a reduced tost. Knowledge that the Company is prepared to pay a
higher than the current market price could Cause a re-evaluation by investors of
the worth of their shares. With an increased market price the danger of such a
takeover bid could be reduced5’.
This defence, however, is not free of dangers. Even when the repurchase may
succeed in increasing the market price of the shares, this benefit to the target
may be offset by the bidder having to acquire fewer shares in Order to achieve14
control. This is the case where companies are required either to cancel
repurchased shares, or to hold them as non-voting treasury shares. Where the
bidder is already a shareholder, the repurchase Programme would serve to
increase the bidder’s percentage of the shareholding of the Company.
A transaction common in the US and related to repurchases is ‘greenmai?*
There exist two types of ‘greenmail’. The first is the purchase of a substantial
block of the target company’s shares by an unfriendly suitor with the primary
purpose of coercing the target into repurchasing the block at a premium. The
other is where a target undertakes a self-serving buy-out of a bidder who
seriously contemplated a takeover
53
.
Lastly, repurchases may play a role in defence tatics called ‘poison pills’. These
are measures adopted by the management in response to takeover attempts or
in advance of possible takeover attempts that tan Cause severe economic
repercussions in an acquirer or potential controlling person54. Two of the
‘poison pills’ measures involve repurchases: back-end provisions55 and
Convertible preferred stock provisions
56
.
Having looked at some of these defensive tatics, it is now wotth examining in
how far these measures tan be effectively used in the UK and Germany.
In the UK the City Code on Take-overs and Mergers prohibits the board of the
target Company from taking any action which would prejudice the bid once it
has been announced or when it is believed to be imminent
57
. This makes most
post-bid defences almost impossible. Furthermore, when a Company
repurchases its own voting shares, the percentage of the total voting rights
represented will be increased. Any resulting increase in shareholdings of
directors and persons acting in concert with them will be treated as an
acquisition for the purpose of Rule 9
58
. In some cases, therefore, an Obligation
to make a mandatory offer will arise. Moreover, any repurchase of its securities
by an offeree during an offer period is normally prohibited unless the offeree’s15
shareholders specifically approve the proposed action
59
. These provisions are
expressions of the general rule that the Panel of Take-overs and Mergers does
not consider it appropriate for Parties to a bid to buy their own shares during an
offer period
60
But also the statutory provisions require Prior shareholder authorisation which
makes it difficult if not impossible for a target management to use repurchases
in takeovers
61
. The procedural requirements are too time consuming to provide
UK companies with a quick and effective response to an anticipated or
announced bid.
In Germany a Company may acquire its own shares up to a total value of 10
percent of its share capita162, .rf this is neceassary in Order to avert serious and
63
imminent darnage to the Company . Darnage means here mere loss of assets
and indirect consequential darnage is accepted to be sufficient 64. The
application of this Provision in a hostile takeover context has not yet been
tested in tourt and the academic literature is divided on this Point.
An older view maintains that the acquisition of a controlling interest in a
Company by external capital constitutes such indirect darnage. The advocates
of this view argue that such an acquisition is to be viewed in Company law as a
threat, if the new controller would be a competing concern or a foreign capital
investor-, and this justifies the repurchase of own shares
65
. And it has been
submitted that this Provision would be applicable in the Situation in which the
management thinks that a better bid is in the offering, from the Point of view of
the majority of the shareholders, and they repurchase in Order to prevent the
success of the former bid
66
. This view, however, is
does not take into account that only darnage to the
not to some part of its members or the board of
provisions of the AktG67.
too one-sided because it
Company as a whole and
directors falls under the16
An alternative view is that the repurchase of own shares is permissible only
when the potential purchaser threatens to wind up the Company or darnage it
severely68. Such an exceptional case could arise in the case of raiders who
seek to make the acquisition with such high loans that they are dependent on
the liquidation of the acquired company’s capital in Order to pay off their loans.
However, most legal experts are of the opinion that an impending hostile bid
will not justify a repurchase. It is argued that the concrete Organisation of a
Company is something not protected by the AktG6’. A Change in the controlling
interest may Cause harm to an individual member of the board of directors, but
involves no darnage to the Company. If the risk of a Company  passing into
foreign control were sufficient to fulfil the exceptions laid down by the AktG,
then the board of directors could decide who would become a member of the
Company. This is a right which the AktG does not give. Therefore, a risk of
passing into foreign control is in any case not sufficient to justify the
Supposition of imminent darnage to the Company
70
.
Another possible defensive measure is the repurchase of shares with a view to
issuing them to the employees of the Company. In accordance with the AktG
shares acquired by the Company in Order to offer them to the employees must
be issued within one year from acquisition
71
. Therefore, before the bid is
imminent, the target Company tan reduce the possibility of shareholding of the
hostile bidder by the repurchase of own shares. But a supplementary restriction
on the transferability of the shares will be necessary, so that the hostile bidder
cannot obtain these shares through the employees. And it may be as easily
turned into an instrument benefiting the raider if he gets the employee
shareholders to vote in favour of his proposals.
Therefore, repurchases under German law are even less a fit means for
warding off a raider than under UK legislation
72
.17
6. Repurchases in a Going Private Transaction
A going private transaction is a transaction designed to eliminate or
substantially reduce the company’s outstanding public equity73
. It tan involve a
cash repurchase offer by the Company, followed by a transaction to ‘mop up’
the shares of non-tendering shareholders through certain possible
mechanisms, a Pattern found in US going private transactions in the 1970s 74
.
Such a transaction tan be useful because the smaller the group of
shareholders, the easier it will be for the management to negotiate the
necessary contracts. And the management may seek to reduce the tost of a
public tender by means of a preliminary repurchase Programme aimed at
contracting the number of outstanding shares. The reduced liquidity of the
remaining shares will depress the market price and also place the shareholders
under a coercion to sel1
75
.
Such a reduction of public equity has been seen in Germany by some as
objectionable for policy reasons. Following
encourage wide public equity participation
be undesirable that legislation facilitates
reduction of public ownership
76
.
the principle that legislation should
in companies, it would prima facie
the elimination or even only the
Besides, there is no evidente that repurchases played any role in UK going
private transactions so far. In a Management Buy-Out (MBO) where the
management helds only a small part of the company’s shares or no shares at
all, and this is likely to be the case in a quoted Company, almost all of the
target’s asset value will need to be paid out on the repurchase and
consequently, the Company will need to be refinanced by external investors 77
.
From the Point of view UK Company law takes there are no advantages for
using repurchases in MBOs
78
.Similarly, in Germany the stritt rules
make repurchases not feasible in
18
concerning the maintenance of capital
going private transactions  and have
7n
prevented MBOs occuring in greater numbers so far’“.
7. Repurchases to Increase the Earnings Per Share
Repurchases have been suggested as a way to increase the earnings per
share (EPS) by reducing the number of shares outstanding because the future
earnings are going to be divided among a smaller number of shares 80. lt is
quite common in the US and a recent example may be given by Conner
Peripherals Corp. which bought back shares for $ 241 million to boost the
company’s EPS8’.
This view, however,
automatically increase
is wrong because
with a repurchase.
the expected
Unless financed
EPS does not
by a new debt
offering, repurchases also mean a reduction in the company’s assets. To the
extent that those assets are efficiently employed and thus contribute
proportionately to earnings, a reduction in assets will mean a reduction in
82
earnings  . Expected EPS will increase only if the reduction in shares
outstanding is proportionately greater than the reduction in expected net
income83.
Furthermore, even if the repurchase does Cause an increase in expected EPS,
this increase will be achieved only by increasing the financial leverage of the
Company and, thus, the financial risk of the shareholders. Any rise in the EPS,
will be offset by higher return demanded by shareholders as compensation for
bearing greater risk. The price of the outstanding shares will increase only if
the increase in expected return dominates the increase in risk brought about by
this financial leveraging of EPS.
Therefore the EPS effect of a repurchase has to be seen as being a financial
illusion.19
8. Repurchases to Increase the Capital Mobility
A repurchase may act as a device to increase capital mobility in the securities
market. Repurchases permit the redistribution of risk-taking venture capital
towards new and rapidly growing companies and away from non-growth
companies. On this view, repurchases increase investment opportunities by
releasing to shareholders unneeded funds for alternative investment and
thereby promote the more efficient distribution and allocation of capital
resources in the economy.
9. Miscellaneous
In addition to these reasons, other valid
Some of the more widely known are
84
acquisitions , the settlement of a
bases for such transactions  exist.
the facilitation of mergers and
shareholder’s
85
indebtness , the
encouragement of employee share schemes
86
, the reduction of shareholder
servicing costs
87
and the possibility to accelerate the redemption of shares
88
,
Last but not least, it is worth mentioning that there might be circumstances
where a Company might want to provide a market for its shares
89
. However,
this is a reason more likely for the private, closely-held Company.
IV. Drawbacks Arising from a Repurchase
lt has been shown that repurchases involve most doctrinal institutions of
Company law. This consequently includes all possibilities of abuse. Some forms
of abuse have been mentioned already. However, there are five aspects which
will have to be examined seperately.20
1. Effects on Creditors
One of the most important functions of Company law is still the protection of
creditors. Because of the limited liability of companies, Company law has to
secure the raising and maintenance of equity capital as a sort of guarantee for
creditors“. Of course, no Company law Provision tan remove the risk that the
Company will incur losses in the usual course of its business, which will use up
its assets. But the principle of raising and maintenance of capital has a stricter
meaning: it prevents the founders and shareholders of a Company from
harming creditors
taking it arbitrarily
If, at the time the
Surplus or if the
by keeping the minimum capital from the Company
away.
or by
repurchase is made, the Company does not have an actual
amount paid exceeds the Surplus, in economic terms the
repurchase is a return of the shareholder’s contribution
91
. And in the case of
partly paid shares the raising of capital will be imperilled because the Company
only holds a Claim against itself.
Therefore, a repurchase may impair the creditors’ margin of safety against the
business losses incurred by the Company. Nothing of value to creditors takes
the place of the shares repurchased except what is in reality an unissued
share, as there is no certainty that the shares tan be reselled in the future92.
This shrinkage of the company’s capital base threatens particularly the
unsecured creditors whose de facto security is the liquidation value of the
company’s net marketable assets.
In the UK the principle that the creditors of a Company have a right to rely on
the maintenance of its paid up capital as a guarantee fund for the payment of
their Claims was the principle rationale of the English common law rule
prohibiting such repurchases. However, a repurchase by a Company of its own
shares does not lead to a reduction of capital if the repurchase is out of the21
company’s Profits and an amount equivalent to the nominal value of the shares
purchased is placed in a seperate capital account.
The CA 1985 stipulates therefore that the reduction in share capital account
caused by the cancellation of the share repurchased must be compensated
either by new capital from a new issue of shares made for the purpose93
or by
transferring distributable Profits from the profit and loss account to a capital
redemption reserve
94
which is to be treated as’ paid-up share capitalg5. If the
price at which a Company repurchases its shares is greater than their nominal
value then the excess is treated in the same way as a redemption premium on
the redemption of own shares
96
. And shares that are to be repurchased have
97
to be fully paid up , otherwise the creditors would lose a valuable asset on
liquidation, namely uncalled capital. These provisions, enforced by effective
98
penalties , ensure that there is no erosion of the capital maintenance
doctrine”.
German law goes a somewhat different way. It contains similar restrictions on
the funds to be used for repurchases but seeks to protect creditors also by
restricting the circumstances in which a repurchase is permitted.
In principle a Company may not repurchase its own shares
100
and a
repurchase is only permitted when necessary to avert serious and imminent
darnage to the Company
101
, to offer the repurchased shares to employees and
retired employees of the Company or a related enterprise
102
or to indemnify
shareholders‘03. In all three cases the aggregate nominal amount of the
repurchased shares may not exceed 10 percent of the capital stock including
the shares which the Company has already acquired and still possesses 104
.
Furthermore, the reserve to be formed to offset the repurchase of shares 105
must constitute an amount equal to the acquisition value of the shares without
reducing the share capital or the reserves, to be formed in accordance with the22
AktG or the articles, which may
shareholders
106
. Thus, there exists a
not be used for payments to the
capital limit for the repurchase of the
company’s own shares. These provisions which serve to sustain the share
capital
107
are complemented by the requirement that the par value or higher
amount for issue of the shares must be fully paid
108
. Penalty provisions
109
and
provisions granting damages from the board of directors”’ and from the
supervisory board
111
in cases where the repurchase is undertaken illegaly
ensure the effectiveness of the requirements.
2. Effects on Shareholders
A repurchase tan in principle be done through an invitation to tender, as a
targeted repurchase or through a transaction on a stock exchange.
Where the repurchase is made as an invitation to tender, the shareholders
voluntarily decide whether or not to sel1 and divide themselves accordingly. In
contrast, where the Company makes a targeted repurchase, the division is
involuntary: the Company selects the selling shareholders and places all others
in a remaining group. Therefore, in the latter case a repurchase may result in
an improper discrimination between shareholders, where favoured members
are bought out at a substantial premium to the market price or true value of
their shares. This leads to a dilution of the value of the remaining shares
112
.
Another possible instance may be where a Company acquires shares at a
discount to their true value, thereby increasing the equity value of the
remaining shares at the expense of the vendor shareholders113
.
And it is possible that majority shareholders, in expectation of losses of the
Company and a decline in the share price, sel1 their shares to the Company at
what is in fact an overvaluation. When it becomes obvious that the liquidation
will result in less than par repayments for the other shareholders, the23
repurchase brings about something which has to be called a ‘preferential
liquidation’.
In fact, where the shares are not repurchased at a fair value such a transaction
always shifts wealth from one group of shareholders at the expense of another.
The fact that a shareholder is not obliged to sell his shares to the Company 114
does not alter this fact.
The potential for internal inequities tan be minimised through mainly three
requirements: disclosure of details of any share repurchase activity before and
after the event, Prior Permission by shareholders and the requirement to
repurchase shares through a stock exchange.
Adequate disclosure is ensured in the UK first of all by the requirement that
companies are permitted to repurchase their shares only if authorised by their
articles’15. This prevents shareholders from unexpected activities by the
Company although this alone does not provide adequate Publicity.
Consequently, the CA 1985 contains a number of detailed disclosure and
notification requirements to ensure that the transaction is done openly
116
.
A second method of safeguarding shareholders’ rights is to lay down a general
requirement that companies wishing to repurchase their shares must obtain
Prior Permission from the groups whose interests might be adversly affected.
This tan be effective against most forms of abuse, without limiting the potential
benefits from the use of share repurchases. It is for this reason that the CA
1985 distinguishes between market purchases and off-market purchases
117
and requires that both forms of repurchase must be authorised by a resolution
of the shareholders, which must stipulate the terms of the repurchase. The
sanction required for an off-market purchase is greater than that required for a
market purchase because here the Company will be the price maker and there
is not equality of access for the selling shareholders as in a market purchase.
Furthermore, the lower level of regulation of market purchases takes into
account that fact that the market authorities impose their own regulatory24
requirements which, coupled with the higher degree of Publicity, will be
sufficient to deter the more blatant abuses of the procedure. For market
purchases a Prior authorisation by an ordinary resolution subject to certain
conditions is required‘18 and requirements which are not contained in the CA
1985 itself might have to be observed under certain circumstances“‘. In the
case of off-market purchases there has to be an approval of the terms of the
purchase contract, including the actual price, by a special resolution before the
Company enters into the purchase contract‘*O. In Order to prevent
discrimination between the shareholders the CA 1985 provides that, in relation
to an off-market purchase, votes in respect of shares to which the resolution
relates are to be ignored
121
.
Another requirement imposed by the London Stock Exchange on listed
companies which ensures equal treatment of shareholders is that repurchases
within a period of twelve months of 15 percent or more of its equity shares must
be made by way of either a tender or a partial offer to all shareholders
122
.
Selective repurchases are therefore prohibited.
Further safeguards are provided by the general remedies concerning the
123
protection of minorities . These rules provide remedies if the directors use
their power in a way which is unfairly prejudicial to some patt of the members.
The requirements relating to repurchases, together with these general
remedies, are strong deterrents to inequitable practices.
The fact that German law allows repurchases only to a very limited extent
reduces the opportunities for unequal treatment of shareholders. But even in
the cases where repurchases are allowed the provisions of the AktG still
require that no shareholder should arbitrarily be treated differently from other
shareholders’24. The wish to buy out members at a favoured price or to buy
out insurgent shareholders at a price above the market price will clearly violate
this principle of equal treatment
125
. Therefore, it is submitted by commentators25
that repurchases in principle have to be made through a stock exchange and, if
this is not possible, at least through a tender offer. Selected repurchases shall
only be allowed in the case where it is necessary, in Order to avoid serious and
imminent darnage to the Company, to acquire shares from specific
126
shareholders  . However, disclosure requirements still provide full information
to all shareholders and leave no room to use this exception for benefiting only
some part of the company’s members
127
. Furthermore, each shareholder has
duties of loyalty both to the Company and to other shareholders (so-called
Treuepflichten)‘28, which make it not feasible for a group of shareholders to be
bought out at the exepense of another. Further, in a recent ruling from the
Oberlandesgericht Oldenburg it was shown that the principle of equal treatment
works the other way round, too. In the case where the Company is about to
resell its repurchased shares, it was held, the Company has to keep to  stritt
neutrality and is bound to observe the principle of equal treatment. Thus a
Company has to resell its shares through the stock market or if not possible
through a Stockbroker
129
.
3. Effects on Corporate Governance
I
It is the management which controls the timing and terms of repurchase and,
except for market repurchases and tender offers to all shareholders, selects the
selling and remaining shareholders.
If the management holds shares, it is interested in the transaction, whether it
belongs to the selling or remaining group13’. If it is not a shareholder, the
reorganisational effect of the transaction will make it an interested Party in a
wider sense. Targeted repurchases tan have as their objective the elimination
of shareholders who pose an actual or potential threat to the management.
Furthermore, management could insulate itself against shareholder action by
buying off shareholder opponents without regard to whether this will be26
beneficial to the Company or not. Such managerial behavior may then be
described as management entrenchment, a behavior common in the 1920s and
the early 1930s when many German companies were creating shares to protect
themselves (so-called Schuf~aktiie~)‘~‘.
From the management’s Point of view a repurchase may be desirable to
prevent shares from falling into the hands of potential ‘unfriendly’ bidders which
might want to dismiss the management 13*. Also repurchases tan be used to
protect incumbent management from exposure to shareholder discontent in
general meeting that might otherwise follow from a substantial decline in the
market price of the shares.
Therefore, generally speaking, repurchases tan be used to enable an
incompetent management to remain in control
133
, which is the ‘most serious
threat to owner control’
134
.
And it should not be forgotten that since repurchases Change ownership
participation,  they alter the existing allocation of authority between the
management and the members. Thus, the management could try to strengthen
its influence in the general meeting by using the company’s assets to
repurchase shares in Order to alter the voting control of the Company. This
would be contrary to the compelling division of powers between the Organs of a
Company and could lead to a Stabilisation of an unsuccessfull management.
Shareholders will be affected directly or indirectly by a Change in the balance of
voting power if the repurchase is not from all shareholders and proportional to
their holdings. The voting control will be directly affected if the repurchased
shares carry voting rights which the management is entitled to use in the
general meeting. But even where the Company is not entitled to enjoy the voting
rights of repurchased shares, an abuse is still possible. By removing the
repurchased shares from the voting arena a minority of shareholders tan be
converted into a majority, which is now able to gain control in general meeting.
And even where a majority cannot be achieved, the relative voting strengh of
the management or any related group will be increased anyway.27
For directors of UK companies it is not enough to comply with the procedures
laid down in the CA 1985 because the procedures simply provide an exception
to the general Prohibition on a Company to repurchase its shares. As with all
powers, the power to repurchase the company’s own shares is subject to the
general requirement that directors must act honestly, in good faith and in the
best interests of the Company. The rules concerning the directors’ duties of
care, skill and good faith provide remedies if the directors use their power for
an improper purpose or to benefit themselves
135
. lt is clear that a repurchase
by the directors on behalf of the Company of the company’s own shares would
be a breach of duty by the directors if the main purpose was to enhance their
136
Position , although suing directors for breaches of duty is notoriously difficult
in the UK’37.
By providing that the repurchased shares have
138
reissued  , the CA 1985 helps to protect
shareholders.
to be cancelled and not to be
the rights of the remaining
In Germany, as in the UK, the repurchase of own shares is always a measure
of management and therefore taken by the board of directors
139
. By providing
that the Company shall enjoy no voting, dividend or preemptive rights from its
own shares, whether the shares were legally or illegally acquired, German law
prevents the board of directors from extending its influence in general meeting
140
directly  . And shares repurchased in Order to issue them to employees have
to be disposed of within one year
141
so that they cannot be used by the
management for an improper purpose.28
4. Effects on the Stock Market
Among the abuses associated with repurchases, market price manipulation tan
be seen as one of the most insidious.
In an efficient market a substantial increase in buying, normally reflecting
increased demand, without any corresponding increase in supply, will disturb
the elibrium and affect the market price.
The market price may also be affected if companies are entitled to hold
acquired shares as treasury shares rather than cancelling them. This would
enable a Company to buy shares, hold them as an asset, and later resell them.
The Company would then have the ability to advance the market price through
large-scale anonymus repurchases, and likewise depress the market price by
putting a large block of repurchased shares back onto the market.
The London Stock Exchange requires companies intending to undertake
repurchases to notify such activities in detail Prior to and after the event takes
place 142. By this means, the market, the company’s shareholders and potential
investors are made aware of the influence of the Company in the market, and
thereby tan make more reasoned investment decisions.
Repurchases designed to manipulate the stock market will certainly fall foul of
the Financial Services Act 1 986143.
Moreover trafficking in shares by companies is avoided if shares have to be
cancelled after repurchased by the Company. Therefore, UK law prescribes that
shares have to be treated as cancelled on the repurchase 144. Speculation  by
companies against their own share price by buying and selling rights to
repurchase them is also prohibited
145
.
Stock market manipulation by German companies is not likely because of the
very limited extent to which a repurchase is possible.29
The need to avoid serious and imminent darnage to the Company allows up to a
certain extend a repurchase146. Very recently, there has been a ruling by the
Bundesgerichfshof in an obiter dicfum which accepted the disturbance of the
stock market and a Variation in the market price as beeing such a darnage to
the Company147. However, it was neither said how serious the disturbance has
to be nor in how far the Company has to be affected by the disturbance.  And
one has to oberserve that the Company concerned in this judgement was a
bank. It is therefore unclear in how far the ruling could also apply to a non
bank148. On the top of this is the fact that the academic literature takes the
view that the mere Variation of share prices constitutes not such a darnage.
Only in a rare and extreme case a Company would be allowed to repurchase its
own shares in Order to influence the market price. Therefore, a Company will
normally be prohibited from intervening in the functioning of the market by
repurchases and from pegging the market price of their own shares
149
.
Furthermore, German law contains certains requirements to transfer or redeem
repurchased shares which do not make it feasible for companies to deal in their
150
own shares  .
Further, when a Company repurchases its own shares, it invariably possesses
knowledge of facts not availiable to all shareholders or the general trading
public. Therefore, a repurchase tan increase the possibility of insider trading
both by the Company which acquires its shares and third persons
151
.
A Company could acquire shares for a price which is too low in a case where its
decisionmakers are in possession of confidential price sensitive information
concerning those shares and where the Seller, if he had had that information,
would have not sold at that price. lt will not be uncommon for a Company to
have material information of this nature in its possession.Third persons may also benefit improperly from repurchases. For instance,
insiders who are aware that the Company proposes to repurchase its shares at
30
a premium price to the market, may be tempted to acquire the company’s
shares in advance of a public announcement  of the intended repurchase.
Another possibility would arise where an influential insider withdraws his
contribution in the Company in which he has, because of confidential
information, lost trust.
In the UK the provisions of the Criminal Justice Act 1993 dealing with insider
dealing have to be oberserved15*. If the directors are in possession of
unpublished price sensitive information, they are not permitted to procure any
other person (including the Company) to deal in those securities on a stock
exchange for the purpose of making a profit or avoiding loss.
Furthermore, accordingly to the Model Code for Securities Transattions  by
Directors by the London Stock Exchange a director must not deal in any
securities of a listed Company at any time when he is in possession of
unpublished price-sensitive information in relation to those securities153. The
terms of the Model Code apply also to a Company repurchasing own shares so
that both, the company’s director and the Company itself, are prohibited to act
as an insider
154
.
Market manipulation by means of a repurchase of own shares on a German
stock exchange is, again, because of the restrictiveness of German law, quite
unlikely to occur. However, such an attempt will clearly violate the new insider
155
trading rules . Under these rules an insider must not use insider information
for transactions  in securities for his own benefit or a third Party, nor must he
pass any information to a Party who is not an insider.31
5. Effects on the Company3 Business
A repurchase of own shares increases the financial risk of the Company. The
Company acquires an asset which does not contribute to its diversification as
the value of that asset will correlate with the company’s Profits 156
. In the sense
that the share prices reflect the future earnings of the Company in the long run,
the share price will decline in the same degree as the profit prospects of the
157
Company  . Economic failure will Capture the Company now twice. Therefore,
it would be a bad advice for a Company which is in financial difficulties to leck
up its capital because such shares could be sold only with great economic
losses if at all.
However, as it was shown above both UK and German law contain restrictions
on the funds availiable for repurchases. This prevents that repurchases will
lead to a greater risk of Company failure. And since UK law requires
cancellation of repurchased shares there is no acquisition of an asset by the
Company at all. In that sense it is a simple distribution of assets.
IV. Concluding Remarks
Recently a discussion has come up as to whether to alter the stritt German
rules concerning the maintenance of capital. lt has been suggested that this
should include a relaxation of the rules prohibiting repurchases 158
. It is mainly
argued that the protection of creditors would simply not justify such an effort.
And it has been submitted that the rules prohibiting the
shares should at least be interpreted in a way which would
pursue their economic aims in a better way
159
.
repurchase of own
allow companies to32
This view is to reject because the rationale behind the prohibtion on the
repurchase of own shares is not the protection of creditors alone. lt has been
shown that there are more good reasons for controlling the methods and
purposes of repurchases. The abuses connected with repurchases span the
entire range of Company chicanery. These practices, although they are not
necessary incidents of repurchases, demand restrictive provisions for those
transactions.
The 2nd Directive left it open to Member States whether or not to allow
repurchases. By imposing only minimum requirements with regard to
shareholder’s authorization, the extent to which a Company may hold its own
shares and the funds availiable for repurchases, a considerable discretion was
left to Member States. The UK, more generous than Germany by not limiting
the situtations in which repurchases might be permissible or the value of the
shares that may be repurchased, therefore had to impose much more detailed
provisions in Order to prevent possible abuses. On the other hand German law
does not know any self-regulatory rules imposed by the stock  exchange like the
UK. This type of rule, typical for UK Company law, is seen as unnecessary in
the light of the AktG. Therefore, UK and German law differ to some extent. Both
legal Systems Strike the balance between the conflicting interests of ensuring
corporate flexibility and yet providing protection for creditors, shareholders and
the general investing public differently. Nevertheless, it is submitted, are both
alternatives acceptable. The lack of relevant litigation in these transactions
Shows that both legal Systems have dealt with these type of corporate
transaction properly.
On the other hand it has to be seen that most of the aims pursued by
companies when repurchasing their own shares tan be achieved through other
methods. Some of the reasons, e.g. to use it as a self-investment or to increase
the EPS, are even just illusory. One of the few reasons which may be valid is
the use of repurchases to distribute Surplus cash resources to shareholders.
Thus there is simply no necessity to relax those rules.33
Both legislative proposals from the Commission of the European Community
and from the German government seem to share this view. In the proposed
Sociefas Europaea the provisions concerning the acquisition of own shares are
somewhat more stringent than those of the 2nd Directive16’. Furthermore, the
proposed Directive on Takeovers includes a Provision to limit the ability of
target companies to repurchase their shares during a takover bid without Prior
161 shareholder approval . And a Change in the German provisions concerning
the repurchase of own shares was only done in respect to banks dealing with
their own shares. However, it does not contain any relaxation of these stritt
rules but is only seeking to clarify the law in this area 162
.*
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